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Taking a shower in Youth Hostels:
risks and delights of heterogeneity
Christina Matzke∗ and Damien Challet† ‡
February 2, 2008
Tuning one’s shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging co-
ordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity
increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearn-
able. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions,
identical agents are unlikely to reach even approximately their favorite wa-
ter temperature. Heterogeneity allows some agents to reach much better
temperatures, at the cost of higher risk.
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1 Introduction
Taking a shower can turn into a painful tuning and retuning game when many
people take a shower at the same time if the flux of hot water is insufficient.
In this fascinating game, it is in the interest of everybody not only to reach an
agreeable equilibrium temperature but also to avoid large fluctuations. These
two goals are difficult to achieve because one inevitably not only has incomplete
information about the behavior and personal preferences of the other bathers,
but also about the non-linear intricacies of the plumbing system.
∗Bonn Graduate School of Economics, Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Ade-
nauerallee 24-26, D-53113 Bonn, Germany; e-mail: christina.matzke@uni-bonn.de
†Institute for Scientific Interchange, Viale S. Severo 65, 10133 Torino, Italy
‡Physics Department, University of Fribourg, Pe´rolles, CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
1
ht
tp
://
do
c.
re
ro
.c
h
2 The Shower Temperature Problem
The central issue of this paper is to find the conditions under which the agents
are satisfied, which depends on the learning procedure and on its parameters.
The need to depart from rational representative agents was forcefully voiced
among others by Kirman (2006) and Brian Arthur, for instance in his El Farol
bar problem (Arthur 1994), subsequently simplified as Minority Game (Challet
and Zhang 1997, Challet, Marsili and Zhang 2005), from which we shall borrow
some ideas concerning the learning mechanism. In these models, the agents try to
behave maximally differently from each other, hence the need for heterogeneous
agents.
The Shower Temperature Problem is different in that the perfect equilibrium is
obtained when all the agents behave exactly in the same optimal, unique way. A
priori, it is a perfect example of a case where the representative agent approach
applies fully. As we shall see, however, because in practice there is a maximum
number of tap tuning settings, it may pay off to be heterogeneous with respect
to the strategy sets. Therefore, the problem we propose in this paper is another
example of a situation where heterogeneity is tempting because potentially bene-
ficial. The intrinsic and strong non-linearity of the temperature response function
prevents the use of the mathematical machinery for heterogeneous systems that
successfully solved the Minority Game (Challet et al. 2005, Coolen 2005), the El
Farol bar problem (Challet, Ottino and Marsili 2004) and the Clubbing problem
(De Sanctis and Galla 2006).
2 The Shower Temperature Problem
One of the problems of poor plumbing systems is the interaction between the
water temperatures of all the people taking a shower simultaneously. If one person
changes her shower setting, she influences the temperature of all the other bathers.
Cascading shower tuning and retuning may follow. A key issue is how people can
learn from past temperature fluctuations how to tune their own shower so as to
obtain an average agreeable temperature Tˆ , and also to avoid large temperature
fluctuations.
Some rudimentary shower systems allow only for one degree of freedom, the de-
sired fraction of hot water in one’s shower water, denoted by φ ∈ [0, 1]. Assuming
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2 The Shower Temperature Problem
that H and C denote the maximal fluxes of hot and cold water available to a
shower, and that the total flux at this shower is constant, the obtained tempera-
ture is equal to
T =
φHTH + CTC(1− φ)
φH + C(1− φ)
, (1)
where TH and TC denote the constant temperatures of hot and cold water.
In the following, we shall consider the special case were H = C, TC = 0, and
TH = 1, which amounts to express T in TH units, i. e. to rescale T by TH , which
leads to T = φ.
The situation may become more complex however if many people take a shower
at the same time. Indeed, it sometimes happens that altogether the N bathers
ask for a larger hot water flux than the plumbing system can provide, a feature
more likely found in old-style youth hostels than in more upmarket hotels (hence
the title). Assume that the total available hot water flux for all bathers together
is H while the cold water flux available at each single shower is C = H . We
denote by Φ =
∑N
i=1 φi the total fraction of asked hot water. If Φ > 1, each agent
will only receive φi/Φ instead of φi and the total flux of hot water she obtains is
smaller than expected.1 Finally, agent i obtains
Ti =
φi
φi +Ψ(1− φi)
, (2)
where Ψ = max(1,Φ). Clearly, Ti(φi = 0) = 0 and Ti(φi = 1) = 1. When Φ ≤ 1,
this equation reduces to the no-interaction case Ti = φi. Therefore, provided that
Φ > 1, the agents interact through the temperature they each obtain, that is, via
Φ. Assuming no inter-agent communication, the global quantity Φ is the only
means of interaction. Therefore, this model is of mean-field nature. Henceforth,
we consider the more involved case of interaction, i. e. Φ > 1.
1The fraction of cold water in this case is still 1 − φi, according to the agent’s choice, since
cold water is assumed to be unrestricted.
3
ht
tp
://
do
c.
re
ro
.c
h
3 Tuning one’s shower
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Figure 1: Individual temperature as a function of φ in the homogeneous case for
increasing N (from top to bottom).
3 Tuning one’s shower
3.1 Equilibrium and sensitivity: the homogeneous case
Before setting up the full adaptive agent model, we shall discuss the homogeneous
case where φi = φ.
Assuming that all the agents have the same favorite temperature (Tˆi = Tˆ ≤ 1),
they do not interact if N ≤ 1/Tˆ , in which case φ = Tˆ . If N > 1/Tˆ the equilibrium
is reached when
φ = φeq = 1−
1
N
(
1
Tˆ
− 1
)
. (3)
Hence, there is always a φ that satisfies everybody (for instance, setting Tˆ = 1/2
leads to φeq = 1−1/N). In equilibrium each agent actually gets φeqH/(N ·φeq) =
C/N hot water instead of φeqH and thus a total water flux of C/N+(1−φeq)C =
C/(NTˆ ). Hence, indeed the desired temperature Tˆ is reached for every agent,
but the total water flux per agent is quite small for large N .
The sensitivity of T to φ, defined as χ = dT
dφ
= N
[1+N(1−φ)]2
is an increasing function
of φ and maximal at φ = 1 (a similar result also holds for Ti =
φi
φi+Φ(1−φi)
). The
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3 Tuning one’s shower
problem is that χ(φeq) = NTˆ
2 ∝ N ; therefore, as N increases, tuning φ around
φeq becomes more and more difficult, suggesting already that the agents might
experience difficulties to learn how to tune their shower. Figure 1 illustrates this
phenomenon: as N increases, the region in which most of the variation of T
occurs shrinks substantially.
This problem is made worse by the fact that, in practice, there is only a finite
number Smax of φs that can be effectively used by the agents, mostly because
of internal tap static friction—the larger the friction, the smaller the number of
different achievable φs. Assuming that the resolution in φ is δφ, or equivalently
that S = 1/(δφ) values of φ are usable, it becomes impossible to tune one’s shower
if |T (φeq ± δφ)− Tˆ | ≃ χ(φeq)δφ is larger than some acceptable value. As χ ∝ N
around φeq, S ∝ N is needed; as a consequence, the ideal temperature is not
learnable beyond a number of agents, which is for a large part pre-determined by
the plumbing system.
3.2 Learning
The question is how to reach φeq. In this model, it is hoped that the agents
have a common interest to avoid large fluctuations of Ti around their favorite
temperature Tˆi: the Shower Temperature Problem is a repeated coordination
game (cf. ? and ?) with many agents and limited information.
The dynamics of the agents are fully determined by their possible tap settings,
thereafter called strategies, and by the trust they have in them. Each agent i
has S possible strategies φi,s with s = 1, ..., S chosen in [0, 1] before the game
begins and kept constant afterwards (how to choose the φs is discussed in the
next section). The typical resolution in φ is 1/S; for the same reason, the typical
maximal φi over all the agents is of order 1−1/S. This paper follows the road of
inductive behavior advocated by Brian Arthur: to each possible choice φi,s agent
i attributes a score Ui,s(t) (where t denotes the time step of the game), which
describes its cumulated payoff at time t. The agents choose probabilistically their
φi,s according to a logit model P (φi(t) = φi,s) = exp(ΓUi,s(t))/Z, where Z is a
normalization factor and Γ is the rate of reaction to a relative change of Ui,s.
If one were to follow blindly El Farol bar problem and Minority Game literature,
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3 Tuning one’s shower
one would write
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t) + φi,s
[
Tˆi − Ti(t)
]
.
When S > 2, such payoffs are not suitable any more, as the agents switch be-
tween their highest and smallest φi,s, the intermediate ones being sometimes used
only because of fluctuations induced by the stochastic strategy choice. A payoff
allowing for a gradual increase of φi,s is necessary. Absolute value-based payoffs
are fit for this purpose1: mathematically,
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t)−
∣∣∣Tˆi − Ti(t)
∣∣∣ .
This payoff however does not depend on φi,s. As a consequence, all the strategies
have the same payoff. Therefore, one has to give more information to the agents.
An agent that has perfect information about the plumbing system, the temper-
atures and fluxes of hot and cold water — for instance the plumber that built
the whole installation — may know precisely which temperature she would have
obtained, had she played φi,s′ instead of her chosen action φi,si(t). Such people
are probably not very frequent amongst the general population, however. This is
why we shall consider an in-between case, where the agents’ estimation of Ti,s(t)
is a linear interpolation between the temperature of the strategy currently in use,
i. e. Ti(t) = Ti,si(t) and its correct virtual value. The payoff is therefore
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t)(1− λ)− λ
∣∣∣Tˆi − (1− η)Ti(t)− ηTi,s(t)
∣∣∣ , (4)
where η ∈ [0, 1] encodes the ability of the agents to infer the influence of φi,s
on the real temperature and 0 ≤ λ < 1 introduces an exponential decay of
cumulated payoffs, with typical score memory length ∝ 1/λ. The parameter η
is related to the difference between naive and sophisticated agents as defined by
(Rustichini 1999). The first kind of agents believe that they are faced with an
external process, i. e. that they do not contribute to Φ, whereas sophisticated
agents are able to compute Φ−i = Φ − φi. In this model, perfect sophisticated
agents have η = 1.
1Quadratic payoffs, albeit mathematically sound, are more problematic for performing numer-
ical simulations.
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4 Results
It is natural to measure two collective quantities, the average temperature T ob-
tained by the agents and its average distance from ideal temperature averaged
over all the agents, denoted by ∆T = T − Tˆ ; this characterizes the average tem-
perature obtained by the agents, or how far the agents are collectively from their
goal. The individual dissatisfaction is the distance from the ideal temperature
for a given agent; one therefore measures it with |δT | = 1
N
∑N
i=1 |Ti − Tˆi|; it is a
measure of the average risk.
All the quantities reported here are measured in the stationary state over 10, 000
time steps for Tˆ = 0.5, η = 1, λ = 0.001 and if not stated differently N = 20,
after an equilibration time of 30/(λΓ). The stationary state does not depend
much on λ. On the other hand, the performance of the population is of course
improved as η increases and saturates for η > 0.5. The role of Γ is discussed
below.
4.1 Homogeneous population
Since the equilibrium is reached when all the agents tune their shower in exactly
the same way, trying first homogenous agents (or equivalently a representative
agent) makes sense a priori. We shall therefore set φi,s = φs =
s
S+1
, s = 1, ..., S
so that the agents avoid using only hot or cold water.
Agents with homogeneous strategies have a peculiar way of converging to their
ideal temperature as S increases. Figure 2 displays the oscillations of the reached
temperature with decreasing amplitude as a function of S. The asymmetric
upward and downward slopes are due to the asymmetry of T around φeq, as seen
in Figure 1. Theoretically, this can easily be explained by assuming that all the
agents select the same s that gives T as close as possible to Tˆ . If s was a real
number, sˆ = [1 − 1/N(1/Tˆ − 1)](S + 1). The choice of the agents therefore is
limited to [sˆ] and [sˆ] + 1 where [x] is the integer part of x (one may need to
enforce [sˆ] < S when S < N). T ([sˆ]) and T ([sˆ] + 1) are alternatively closest to
Tˆ , therefore this actual optimal temperature Tth (whichever T ([sˆ]) or T ([sˆ] + 1))
oscillates around Tˆ , as seen in Figure 2. The period of the oscillations is N , and
their amplitude decreases as 1/S. As expected, a very large value of Γ replicates
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Figure 2: Temperature T reached by homogeneous agents as a function of S for
various Γ. Inset: T vs. (S + 1)/N , showing the scaling property of T ,
with N = 10, 20, 40 (asterisks, triangles, crosses).
closely the dented nature of the value of Tth, in which case all the agents take
the same choice even close to the peak of Tth. Generally, smaller Γs (at least
to a certain degree) lead to better average temperatures as it allows to play
mixed strategies, and thus combine two temperature so as to achieve a collective
average result closest to Tˆ . From that point of view. Γ = 50 is a better choice
than Γ = 1000. Hence, there exists an optimal global value of Γ, leading to a
mixed-strategy equilibrium. This is because taking stochastic decisions is a way
to overcome the rigid structure imposed on the strategy space, whose inadequacy
is reinforced by the strong non-linearity of T (φ). A too small Γ is detrimental as
it allows for using φ further away from φeq; because of the shape of T (φ), those
with smaller φ are more likely to be selected.
The individual dissatisfaction |δT | unsurprisingly mirrors |∆T | since all the play-
ers are identical. Both quantities are the same for large Γ as everybody plays
the same fixed strategy. |δT | also decreases as 1/S (see Figure 5). However, the
larger Γ, the smaller |δT |, as each agent manages to get closer to the optimal
choice.
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Figure 3: Temperature T reached by homogeneous agents as a function of S for
Γ = 100. Squares: theory, circles: numerical simulations. Inset: aver-
age deviation I from Tˆ versus Γ (same parameters); the dotted lines
are for eye guidance only.
It is easy to obtain analytical insights by solving the stationary state equations
for Ui,s. For the sake of simplicity, assuming that η = 1 and that only the two φs
surrounding φeq, i. e. [sˆ] and [sˆ] + 1, denoted by − and + respectively, are used,
one obtains the set of equations (independent from λ and i)
Ui,± = U± = −|T± − Tˆ | (5)
where
Ti,± = T± =
1
1 + N+φ++N−φ−
φ±
(1− φ±)
(6)
with N± = N ·P (s = ±), where P (s = +) =
exp(ΓUi,+)
exp(ΓUi,+)+exp(ΓUi,−)
and P (s = −) =
1−P (s = +) is a Logit model for the two-strategy case S = 2. Figure 3 shows the
good agreement between numerical simulations and this simple theory, especially
in the convex part of the oscillations, as long as Γ is large enough (about 50) to
prevent the use of more than 2 strategies.
Being faced with oscillations is problematic since the agents do not know N a
priori and because N may vary with time. In addition, since all the agents select
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Figure 4: Absolute temperature deviation |∆T | reached by homogeneous
(squares) and heterogeneous (circles) agents as a function of S for
Γ = 100. Average over 500 samples for heterogeneous agents.
the same φ for large Γ, not a single agent is ever likely to reach a temperature
close to Tˆ . The agents do not know whether on average they will overheat
or chill. A way to measure this uncertainty is to measure the average |∆T |
over S in numerical simulations, for instance with I =
∑5N
S=N |∆T |/(4N).
2 The
inset of Figure 3 reports that the minimum of I is at Γ ≃ 42 for the chosen
parameters, which shows the existence of an optimal learning rate. Since the
individual satisfaction is maximal in the limit Γ → ∞ (see above) there is no
minimum of a similar measure for |δT |.
4.2 Heterogeneous populations
There are many ways for agents to be heterogeneous. One could imagine to vary
S, Γ, η, λ or Tˆ amongst the agents. Here we focus on strategy heterogeneity,
i. e. the agents face showers with different tap settings: the strategy space of agent
2Simulations show that the average temperature is in fact a function of (S + 1)/N (cf. Figure
2) (instead of a function of S and N), i. e. Figure 3 would look the same if S was fixed and
N varied. Hence we may take the average over S instead of over N .
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4 Results
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Figure 5: Individual dissatisfaction |δT | reached by homogeneous (empty squares)
and heterogeneous agents (full circles) as a function of S for Γ = 1000.
Average over 500 samples for heterogeneous agents. Dashed line: the-
oretical predictions.
i is no longer 1
S+1
, . . . , S
S+1
, but now each agent has an individual strategy space
where each strategy φi,s, s = 1, . . . , S, is assigned a random number from the
uniform distribution on [0, 1] before the simulation.
Intuitively, the effect of heterogeneity is to break the structural rigidity of the
strategy set of a representative agent. Figure 4 reports that |∆T | does not os-
cillate, but converge (from below) faster than S−1 to zero. Homogeneous agents
might achieve a better average temperature depending on N and S, but on the
whole clearly perform collectively worse. In addition, heterogeneous agents ex-
pect to have a smaller than ideal temperature, but on average predictably smaller,
with no strong dependence on S. Thus, the expectation over the temperature of
the agents is much improved by heterogeneity.
However, looking at the average absolute individual deviation from Tˆ reveals
that the uncertainty brought by heterogeneity is considerably worse on average.
Plotting |δT | for both types of agents shows that |δT | is always smaller for homo-
geneous agents (Figure 5). This means that if being heterogeneous is more risky.
Which agent (or equivalently, shower) performs better depends not only on N ,
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Figure 6: Fraction of the runs for which a single heterogeneous agent is worse
off than the other N − 1 homogeneous agents; Γ = 1000 (crosses) and
Γ = 30 (circles). Average over 2000 samples.
but also on the tuning settings of all the agents.
5 Discussion and conclusions
Heterogeneity may be tempting as it suppresses the systematic abrupt oscillations
experienced by homogeneous populations and is collectively better on average.
However, it seems that heterogeneous showers are potentially more risky. In
other words, the agents must consider the trade-off between the temptation of an
expected better temperature and a potentially larger deviation.
The situation discussed above is only global. Does it pay to be heterogeneous for
a single agent? An answer comes from a system consisting of N−1 homogeneous
agents as defined above and a single random one with random φi,ss. The fraction
f of the runs at fixed S that give a better δTi to the homogeneous showers is
reported in Figure 6; this quantity indicates that the majority of heterogeneous
agents are not worse off for about a quarter of the values of S. This finding
is not in contradiction with the fact that the average personal dissatisfaction of
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5 Discussion and conclusions
heterogeneous agents is always larger than that of homogeneous agents: |δT | is
much influenced by large deviations contributed by a minority of agents because
of large temperature sensitivity to small deviations in φ. Finally, the advantage
of the homogeneous population increases with Γ, as a large learning rate helps
only using one’s best strategy.
As a final note, minimizing |∆T | is equivalent to solving a number partitioning
problem (Garey and Johnson 1979) in which one splits a set of N numbers ai > 0
into two subsets, so that the sums of the numbers in the subsets are as close as
possible, which amounts to minimize C = |
∑
i siai| where si = ±1; it is an NP-
complete problem; in other words, the only way to find the absolute minimum of
C is to sample all the 2N configurations. Let us consider an even simpler version
of the Shower Temperature Problem that makes more explicit its NP-complete
nature. Each agent i is given ai and plays φeq + siai, si = ±1. Neglecting the
self-impact on the resulting temperature and the non-linearity of the temperature
response, the analogy between the Shower Temperature Problem and the num-
ber partitioning problem is straightforward. Methods borrowed from statistical
mechanics show that the average optimal C scales as 2−N , which requires to enu-
merate the 2N possible configurations (Mertens 1998). This is much better than
what the agents achieve; the reason for this discrepancy is that the agents do
not reach a stationary state in O(expN) time steps, hence, they cannot sample
all the possible configurations. Another reason is that the optimal solution may
require some agents to use a strategy that would yield a worse temperature than
their optimal choice.
In conclusion, the Shower Temperature Problem shows the subtle trade-offs be-
tween a homogeneous population with equally spaced actions and a fully random
one. In a system where the agents’ action space is not likely to include the opti-
mal equilibrium choice, heterogeneity is a way to solve more robustly, with less
systematic deviation this kind of problem, at the expense of a higher risk for
individual agents.
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